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A survey of 224 Michigan citizens called for jury duty over a 2-month period was conducted to assess 
the jurors '  comprehension of the law they had been given in the judges' instructions. Citizens who 
served as jurors were compared with a base line of those who were called for duty but not selected to 
serve, and with those who served on different kinds of cases. Consistent with previous studies of mock 
jurors, this study found that actual jurors understand fewer than half of the instructions they receive 
at trial. Subjects who received judges' instructions performed significantly better than uninstructed 
subjects on questions about the procedural law, but no better on questions about the substantive 
(criminal) law. Additionally, jurors who asked for help from the judge understood the instructions 
better than other jurors. Since the results replicate previous research using simulated trials, this study 
provides evidence for the generalizability of earlier work to actual trials. 
The belief that juries in most cases apply the relevant law correctly to the facts in 
reaching their verdicts has been referred to as an "invariable assumption of the 
law" (Richardson v. Marsh, 1987). Appellate court judges routinely endorse the 
idea that juries understand the instructions, and appeals based on juries' mistaken 
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interpretation of the law are rarely successful (Parker v. Randolph, 1979; City of  
Los Angeles v. Heller, 1986; United States v. Lane, n. 13, 1986; Martin v. Ohio, 
1987). The appellate bench, however, may be the only place where this invariable 
assumption is widely expressed. 
Among social scientists who have studied jury decision making the opposite 
assumption prevails: Jurors may be quite competent at sorting out the facts, but 
they have a very difficult time understanding the judge's instructions and often 
miss crucial distinctions. Study after study has shown that jurors do not under- 
stand the law they are given, often performing at no better than chance level on 
objective tests of comprehension (Charrow & Charrow, 1979; Elwork, Sales, & 
Alfini, 1977, 1982; Ellsworth, 1989; Forston, 1975; Hastie, Penrod, & Pennington, 
1983; Kaplan & Kemmerick, 1974; Kassin & Wrightsman, 1979; Kerr et al., 1976; 
Severance & Loftus, 1982; Smith, 1987). Ellsworth (1989) found that although 
subject-jurors spent over 20% of their deliberation time discussing the law, only 
about half of their statements were correct, and one fifth were seriously in error. 
Nor did the juries show much progress toward the correct interpretation of the 
instructions over the course of the deliberation. Although some jurors' mistakes 
were corrected by other jurors, an equal number of correct statements about the 
law were abandoned in favor of mistaken ones. The same jurors were generally 
quite competent in their discussions of the facts; their confusion was specific to 
their attempts to define and apply the law. 
Several reasons for this poor performance have been suggested. The most 
obvious is the legal language itself (Charrow & Charrow, 1979; Elwork et al., 
1982). Rewriting judicial instructions with more conventional vocabulary and sen- 
tence structure can significantly increase jurors' recall of the law (Charrow & 
Charrow, 1979; Elwork et al., 1977; Severance & Loftus, 1982). Even when the 
language is simplified, however, accuracy is far from perfect, indicating that the 
convoluted legal language is not the only obstacle to comprehension. 
Typically, jurors receive their education in the law by listening to the judge 
read the instructions aloud--far from the ideal way to absorb complex informa- 
tion. Some states currently require the inclusion of written instructions, while 
other states specifically prohibit them. In most states, it is up to the trial judge to 
decide whether or not to provide written instructions. The argument is that the 
judge is in the best position to determine what form of instructions is most ap- 
propriate for the particular case at hand, but in practice most judges either give 
written instructions all the time, or they do not give them at all. 
There is very little research on the consequences of supplementing the oral 
instructions with a written copy, and the results are mixed. Although jurors seem 
to like the innovation and feel that it helps them understand, the evidence that it 
actually does so is weak (Forston, 1975; Hastie, 1983; Heuer & Penrod, 1989). 
Another source of poor juror comprehension of the law may be the timing of 
the instructions. Although attorneys may make piecemeal reference to the law 
during the trial, it is not until the conclusion of the trial--after the testimony of all 
the witnesses and the closing statements of the attorneys--that the judge system- 
atically instructs the jurors in the substantive law. Smith (1987) found that jurors 
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who were given both pretrial and posttrial instructions had significantly greater 
comprehension of  the judges' instructions for the substantive law and were better 
able to apply their knowledge to the facts of a case than were subjects who 
received pretrial or posttrial instructions only. 
Still another possible shortcoming of current practice is that jurors are rarely 
told that they are allowed to request help from the judge if they have a question 
about the law; thus it may not occur to them to ask for guidance when they need 
it. Even if a jury does request help, such "help" commonly takes the form of a 
verbatim repetition of the confusing instructions. Empirical research on this ques- 
tion is nonexistent; we do not know whether subjects do better when they are told 
that they can ask for help, nor do we know which kind of help (repetition, pro- 
vision of written instructions, restatement, etc.) is most beneficial. 
Although empirical research has consistently indicated that jurors have trou- 
ble comprehending the law presented at trials, and seems to have defined some of 
the sources of these difficulties, few changes have been introduced in the way 
judges instruct juries. Even when appellate courts have cited the research on juror 
comprehension of judges' instructions, they have consistently held that reform 
was unnecessary. If anything, recent judicial opinions have been more likely to 
change the rules governing instructions in ways contrary to the research findings 
than in ways consistent with them, such as prohibiting written instructions in 
jurisdictions where they were formerly permitted (Tanford, 1991). Legislatures, 
state agencies, and special commissions have been somewhat more receptive to 
research-based reform, but still, movement has been glacial (Tanford, 1991). 
Although rapid implementation of social science findings is hardly the norm 
in the legal system (cf. Ellsworth & Getman, 1987), in some ways the lack of 
impact of research on juror comprehension of the law is surprising. The basic 
issue is not politically controversial: no one is arguing that mistaken applications 
of the law are desirable. The proposed reforms are relatively simple, and neither 
researchers nor judges who have tried them have reported any negative conse- 
quences (cf. Sand & Reiss, 1985). 
One reason for this apathy may be that legal policymakers do not trust the 
research. Judges may be particularly skeptical of social science research that 
attempts to simulate what judges do or what happens in a real courtroom. They 
may be reluctant to consider the possibility that the juries they instruct might not 
do better than random guessing on a test for memory of the law. 
Indeed, most of the studies demonstrating jurors'  poor comprehension of the 
law have been simulations, performed in laboratories with mock jurors hearing (or 
reading) mock cases. Early studies typically relied on students to serve as jurors. 
Students are not representative of actual jurors in age, education, experience, or 
political beliefs. Although more recent studies have commonly used adult subjects 
who are eligible for jury service, some doubts remain about the representativeness 
of the samples. An actual jury is not simply 12 people called from tax, election, or 
motor vehicle lists: Rather, a jury consists of people selected by judges and 
attorneys through voir dire, a process that eliminates as many as half of all po- 
tential jurors. Few researchers have bothered with this expensive procedure. In 
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terms of basic theory, and in terms of internal validity, it adds little. There is no 
reason to believe that the results should not apply to actual jurors; on the other 
hand, there is little direct evidence that they do. 
Questions have also been raised about experimenters' ability to capture the 
atmosphere of a real trial in a laboratory setting. Certain aspects of a trial are 
costly, time-consuming, or simply impossible to recreate in an experiment. Actual 
trials include a judge, attorneys, plaintiffs, defendants, witnesses, court officers, 
a courtroom, deliberation chambers for the jury, unlimited deliberation time, and 
jury sequestration, if necessary. Simulations have ranged from extremely sche- 
matic to extremely realistic, the most realistic to date being the Hastie et al. (1983) 
study of the unanimity rule. 
No matter how realistic the simulation, however, research ethics typically 
require that the subjects be aware that it is a simulation, that no one's fate actually 
depends on their decision. No matter how long simulated juries deliberate (Hastie 
et al., 1983) or how passionately they dispute the issues (Cowan, Thompson, & 
Ellsworth, 1984), there is always the possibility that real juries might behave 
differently; thus our confidence in the generalizability of a laboratory finding is 
usually greatly enhanced by the demonstration of the same result in a study of real 
jurors. With respect to juror comprehension of the law, one might argue that a 
juror who is personally involved in the drama of a real trial might try harder to 
understand the relevant law and might, therefore, perform better than a subject in 
a simulation. 
Finally, in most laboratory studies, the judge's instructions are the only 
source of the relevant law, but in real trials, the attorneys also have opportunities 
to communicate to the jurors about the legal rules. Few good attorneys are con- 
tent to rely on the judge to transmit the law. Instead, trial manuals advise attor- 
neys to explain the pertinent law during voir dire, during opening argument, and 
again during closing argument (Belli, 1954; Bailey & Rothblatt, 1974; Imwinkel- 
reid, 1981; see also Tanford, 1983). In real trials, it is argued, all relevant law will 
be described by the attorneys as well as by the judge, since in the adversarial 
system both sides will emphasize the information that helps their case. Thus many 
legal scholars believe that simulations miss the point, because any ambiguities in 
the judges' instructions are compensated for when the attorneys present their 
cases to the jury and instruct them in the law. According to Tanford (1990): 
by the time the court reads the final jury charge, all important legal issues should have 
been explained to the jury in simplified language three times by each side [voir dire, 
opening statement, closing argument]. If the lawyers were minimally competent, the jury 
will have been alerted at the beginning to the important issues and jurors who cannot 
comprehend the law will have been removed. In argument, the law will have been placed 
in the context of the facts of the case and probably written in outline form on a chalk- 
board. Therefore, most of the suggestions by psycholinguists [about ways to improve 
juror understanding] merely duplicate what a competent trial attorney already does. (p. 
105) 
The purpose of this study is to test the generalizability of the laboratory 
demonstrations of poor juror understanding of the law by examining real jurors' 
ability to recognize the law in the cases they decided. Unlike the subjects in most 
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simulation studies, these jurors were selected (and instructed) by attorneys during 
voir dire, were responsible for the fates of the people on trial, and were exposed 
to the full range of relevant legal information characteristic of a trial the formal 
judicial instructions as well as whatever informal instruction was provided by the 
attorneys during voir dire and opening and closing arguments. 
The design of the study allowed us to assess the jurors'  comprehension of the 
law in several ways. First, of course, their memory of the instructions could be 
judged against an absolute standard of accuracy. Second, citizens who were cho- 
sen to serve on juries (and thus received instructions) could be compared to 
citizens who were called for jury duty but did not actually sit on a jury. Finally, 
we could test whether jurors who received instructions in a particular area of 
substantive law understood that law better than they understood other areas of 
law, and whether they understood that law better than jurors who had not heard 
those particular instructions. That is, if instructions are effective, jurors in an 
assault case should know the definition of assault better than the definition of 
delivery of controlled substances (a within-subject comparison) and better than 
jurors who served in drug sale cases (a between-subjects comparison). Although 
none of these comparisons provides a complete solution to the various problems 
of nonrandom assignment, convergent results from all four comparisons would 
greatly strengthen our confidence in their validity. 
M E T H O D  
Participants 
Participants were recruited from a pool of 558 citizens who were called for 
jury duty for the Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit Court in Washtenaw County, 
Michigan, during February and March of 1989. Shortly after completing their jury 
service, they were mailed a questionnaire designed to test their knowledge of 
substantive and procedural law. Questionnaires were mailed to all those who 
appeared for jury duty, whether or not they actually sat on a trial. Of these people, 
224 returned completed questionnaires (response rate = 40%); 140 of those re- 
sponding had served on juries (63%). 
Ninety-seven percent of the participants had high school diplomas, 53% had 
finished college, and 22% had graduate degrees. Age of participants ranged from 
20 to 70, with 80% between 30 and 59, and 60% between 30 and 49. Twenty-six 
percent had previous jury experience (N = 59). One hundred participants were 
male (45%). Eighty-five percent were employed; most of the unemployed people 
were retired. 
Jurors in Michigan are recruited from the state driver's license and Michigan 
Identification lists. Jury duty lasts for a month, during which those called must 
appear at the courthouse each Monday for the week's jury selections; if they are 
not selected for a jury they do not have to come back to the courthouse untiI the 
next Monday. A juror may be allowed to serve on a 1-day, one-trial basis, if he or 
she can show that the usual procedure would be a serious hardship. The court 
544 REIFMAN, GUSICK, AND ELLSWORTH 
typically allows each attorney 3 peremptory challenges in civil cases, 5 in most 
criminal cases, and 12 in criminal cases involving a possible life sentence. 
Comparison Groups 
During the course of their jury duty, some served on trials; others did not, 
Those who served on criminal trials (n = 118) received procedural instructions 
from the judge on the evaluation of testimony and evidence, the presumption of 
innocence and reasonable doubt, and the factors that may and may not be con- 
sidered during deliberation. Those who did not serve on a trial did not receive any 
instructions (n = 84). A third, smaller set served only on civil trials (n = 22), 
which have somewhat different procedural regulations, most notably on burden of 
proof. Therefore, we were able to compare those who served on criminal trials, 
civil trials, and no trial. 
Participants who served on criminal trials were also instructed in the sub- 
stantive law governing the crime(s) charged. For example, a juror for a stolen 
property case would have heard instructions specific to stolen property, and so 
forth. The majority heard cases involving drug deals ("delivery of controlled 
substances"; n = 63), cases involving assaults ("assault with intent to cause great 
bodily harm," "assault with intent to murder," or "assault with a dangerous 
weapon"; n = 26), or cases involving possession of stolen property (n = 22), with 
the others who heard criminal cases distributed across a large variety of crimes. 
Thus we were able to compare participants who were instructed in a specific area 
of substantive law with those who were not, in terms of their knowledge of that 
particular body of law, and we were able to compare their knowledge of the law 
they had heard with their knowledge of the law governing other types of crime. 
The jury instructions on substantive and procedural law are standardized 
throughout the state of Michigan (Michigan Criminal Jury Instructions, State Bar 
of Michigan, 1987). For a given crime, all judges must give the same instructions, 
word for word, to their juries (State Bar of Michigan, 1988). However, there is no 
required method for delivering these instructions. Michigan judges may, at their 
discretion, deliver the instructions orally only, or they may supplement their 
spoken instructions with a tape recorded version of the instructions, and/or a 
written copy. All three methods of instruction are used by the judges of the 
Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit. Therefore, we were able to compare jurors who 
received oral instructions only versus oral and taped versus oral and written 
instructions. 
The Questionnaire 
The first three pages of the 7-page questionnaire asked about the type of trial 
the jurors had served on (if any), the method the judge had used to deliver the 
instructions, and their previous experience with the law or jury duty. Jurors were 
also asked if they had requested additional instructions from the judge during their 
deliberation. The rest of the questionnaire included 29 questions about the law 
relevant to the various crimes. These questions consisted of one- or two-sentence 
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true-false statements, with a "Don' t  know" option included so that subjects who 
knew they were ignorant could say so. 
The statements were taken from the Michigan Criminal Jury Instructions 
(State Bar of Michigan, 1987) and followed closely the standardized wording. 
Occasional plain-English changes were made in order to simplify excessively 
legalistic passages (example: "The jury may reject the whole testimony of a 
witness who willfully has testified falsely about any one point" was changed to " I f  
a witness lies about any one point the jury may decide not to believe anything the 
witness has said"). However, in order to assure that the statements' legal validity 
was preserved, we made no simplifications that changed or "clarified" the mean- 
ing of the instruction. For example, the definition of reasonable doubt, as stated 
in the instructions, requires that jurors possess a "moral certainty" that a crime 
has been committed in order to cast a guilty vote. This phrase appeared verbatim 
in the questionnaire, because any ambiguity is inherent in the instruction, and to 
remove the ambiguity would be to change the meaning. 
The first ten questions concerned the procedural duties of jurors. These are 
instructions that all jurors in criminal trials receive, telling them how to evaluate 
testimony and evidence, explaining the presumption of innocence and reasonable 
doubt, and delineating the factors that may be considered during deliberation. 
Examples of these questions were: "Unless a juror is morally certain of the truth 
of the charge, that juror has reasonable doubt, as defined by the law" (True); "In 
reaching a decision, the jury may consider the consequences of their verdict" 
(False). These I0 questions were taken from a study by Smith (1987; Smith based 
her questions on California law, but all the statements are also legally correct in 
Michigan). 
The remaining 19 questions concerned the substantive law for various types 
of crimes (see Table 1). Questions were developed for each of the 10 most com- 
monly tried crimes in Washtenaw County. Examples of these questions are (a) for 
assault with a dangerous weapon, " I f  the defendant threatened the victim with a 
pistol which looked dangerous but was really a toy, the defendant is still guilty of 
assault with a dangerous weapon" (True); (b) for delivery of controlled sub- 
stances, ~ person who gives a bottle containing illegal drugs to another person, 
without knowing what is in the bottle, is not guilty of delivering a controlled 
substance" (True). 
Procedure 
On the first day of their jury duty, the clerk told the members of the panel that 
they would receive a questionnaire from the University of Michigan at the termi- 
nation of their jury service and requested that they fill it out, though the voluntary 
nature of the study was emphasized. After their service was over, they received 
an envelope in the mail containing their paycheck, a cover letter, the question- 
naire, and a postage-paid return envelope addressed to the Michigan Law School. 
The cover letter was on University of Michigan letterhead and explained that the 
study was being conducted by the university with the approval and cooperation of 
the Washtenaw County Circuit Court. The importance of preserving and under- 
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standing the jury system was emphasized, and they were told that this was an 
opportunity to communicate their views. 
The response rate would probably have been higher had we been able to 
administer the questionnaires at the courthouse, and jurors' memory for the law 
might have been somewhat better. However, the court administrators feared that 
filling out the questionnaires before jury service was completed might affect ju- 
rors' future deliberations. 
A 40% response rate is not unusual for mail surveys, where response rates 
over 50% are rare (Kerlinger, 1973). Our sample was somewhat unrepresentative 
of the pool from which it was drawn in two ways: First, 63% of our sample had 
actually served on a jury, as compared to 45% of the pool as a whole. (This also 
means that our sample included 56% of the actual jurors.) It is not surprising that 
the people who served on juries should be more interested in filling out the 
questionnaire than those who did not, and for our purposes this "unrepresenta- 
tiveness" is useful, since we are primarily interested in the performance of people 
who actually heard the law as presented at trial, rather than in background levels 
of legal knowledge in the population. Second, highly educated people were some- 
what overrepresented in our sample. Thus, if education is correlated with juror 
comprehension, our results may overestimate jurors' understanding of the law. 
R E S U L T S  
Performance of the Jurors - -Procedura l  Law 
For the 10 questions involving jurors' duties and procedural rules, jurors who 
heard criminal cases answered an average of 4.78 correctly, jurors who heard civil 
cases averaged 4.18 correct, and subjects who did not sit on a trial averaged 3.81 
correct. This effect is highly significant, F(2,221) = 8.67; p < .0005. Instructed 
jurors scored higher than those not instructed, indicating that judges' instructions 
on procedural law improve juror understanding. Jurors who sat on civil cases 
performed somewhat worse than jurors who sat on criminal cases, though the 
effect was of marginal significance (p < . 12). The difference between civil jurors 
and jurors who heard no trial was not significant. The intermediate performance 
of the civil jurors is understandable, as the procedural instructions for civil jurors 
coincide in part and differ in part from the criminal instructions on which the 
questions were based. 
Jurors were more often right than wrong in their answers to questions about 
the impermissibility of considering the consequences of their verdict, the fact that 
statements made by attorneys are not evidence (criminal jurors only), their right 
to consider anything in determining witness credibility, their right to reject the 
entire testimony of a witness who lies on one point, and "moral certainty" as part 
of the definition of reasonable doubt (over 50% of nonjurors got this right as well). 
Jurors were more often wrong than right in their answers to questions about their 
right to ignore irrelevant instructions, the difference between direct and circum- 
stantial evidence, the fact that the prosecution had the burden of proof (less than 
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a third of those who served on criminal juries got this right), the prohibition 
against inferring guilt if a defendant did not testify, and their freedom to reject 
expert testimony. 
Although the instructions significantly improved the jurors' knowledge of the 
procedural rules, their absolute levels of understanding were rather low; even 
instructed jurors got fewer than half of the questions correct. Nor were they aware 
of their ignorance--they very rarely chose the "I  don't know" option (criminal 
jurors: 10% of the time; civil jurors: 11%; nonjurors: 18%). 
Performance of the Jurors--Substantive Law 
Tables 1 and 2 list the results for the substantive law questions. If jurors 
understand the instructions they hear, one would expect that those who served on 
a particular type of criminal case would understand the laws defining that partic- 
ular crime better than other areas of criminal law. This was not the case. A 
comparison of columns A and B in Table 2 shows that criminal jurors were correct 
on 41% of the legal issues pertinent to the cases that they heard, and 33% of the 
legal issues that were irrelevant to those cases. This difference was not significant. 
One might also expect that they would understand the instructions better than 
people who had never heard those instructions. This was not the case either. 
Column C shows that 35% of the questions were answered correctly by individ- 
uals who did not hear the instructions bearing on the particular crimes, not sig- 
nificantly less than the 41% correct response rate by those who did hear the 
Table 1. Percentage Breakdown on Substantive Law Questions 
Question a Incorrect Correct Don't know 
Criminal sexual conduct: victim resistance .08 .60 
Criminal sexual conduct: victim free to leave .40 .17 
Stolen property: knowledge .38 .24 
Stolen property: value of property .03 .54 
Assault with intent to murder: intent to kill .54 .16 
Assault with intent to murder: premeditation .04 .73 
Assault with intent less than murder: intent .44 .26 
Assault with intent less than murder: no injury .18 .50 
Assault with a deadly weapon: no injury .05 .72 
Assault with a deadly weapon: toy gun .04 .61 
Armed Robbery: victim no property .73 .06 
Armed Robbery: gun not used .55 .17 
Manufacturing a controlled substance: personal use .74 .07 
Manufacturing a controlled substance: relabel bottle .18 .22 
Delivery of a controlled substance: knowledge .43 .17 
Operating under the influence: blood alcohol level .18 .46 
Operating under the influence: no physical impairment .03 .75 
Operating while intoxicated: loss of control .19 .41 
Operating while intoxicated: blood alcohol level .33 .26 





















a N = 224 for each question. 
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Table  2. Percent  Correct  on Substant ive  Law Quest ions by Ins t ruc ted  Versus 
Unins t ruc ted  Jurors  
Instructed jurors Uninstructed jurors 
Jurors A. Instructed B. Other C. Baseline for 
instructed for N a questions questions instructed questions 
Stolen property 22 .34 .35 .39 
Assault with intent to 
murder 5 .40 .29 .45 
Assault with intent 
less than murder 11 .59 .40 .36 
Assault with dangerous 
weapon 10 .70 .26 .66 
Armed Robbery 9 .17 .27 .11 
Delivery of controlled 
substances 63 ,25 .38 .14 
Total 120 .41 .33 .35 
N o t e .  An individual may have answered questions about more than one crime, either through serving 
on more than one trial, or through hearing instructions on different possible verdicts in the same trial 
(e.g., lesser included offenses). 
a This figure represents the number of jurors who received each type of instruction. 
instructions. Thus both within-subjects and between-subjects analyses suggest 
that the law as communicated in trials is not well understood by jurors.1 
Another way to examine the results of the substantive law questions is to 
examine each question individually. There were six crimes for which five or more 
jurors were instructed. For only two of these crimes (assault with intent to do 
great bodily harm less than murder and delivery of controlled substances) did 
instructed jurors score higher than 10% over uninstructed subjects (additionally, 
subjects scored higher on their instructed questions than on their uninstructed 
questions for only three of the six crimes, but this may be an effect of comparing 
across questions of varying difficulty). For three of the individual questions (one 
x Our statement that jurors should understand the law they heard better than the law they did not hear 
would be true in the case of perfectly effective instructions. Obviously the instructions were far from 
perfectly effective, so the situation is more complicated: The laws relating to some crimes were 
inherently more difficult to understand with or without instructions. For some crimes, correct re- 
sponding was over 50%; for others, it was below 25%. Thus jurors may not understand the law they 
heard better than the law they did not hear, if they happened to hear instructions on an especially 
difficult law. The comparison between instructed and uninstructed jurors becomes particularly im- 
portant in this context. Even this comparison, however, may be affected by instruction difficulty. If 
there were more jurors who served in trials with "difficult" instructions than in trials with "easy"  
instructions, the overall effect of instructions might be artificially depressed. The percentages at the 
bottom of Table 2 are unweighted means of the six percentages above. Were the individual percent- 
ages to be weighted according to the number of jurors hearing each instruction, the overall means 
might be higher or lower than the unweighted values, thus making the jurors appear somewhat more 
or somewhat less competent. Weighting the percentages in Column A according to the number of 
jurors hearing each instruction results in an overall mean of .34. Weighting the values in Column C 
by n results in an overall mean of .26. Thus, regardless of how the individual percentages are 
combined, absolute levels of performance are low, and the difference between instructed and unin- 
structed jurors is small. 
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on delivery of controlled substances and two on stolen property), there were 
enough respondents to perform chi-square analyses comparing the responses of 
instructed jurors to jurors who served on other trials. Instructed jurors performed 
significantly better on the delivery of controlled substance question than did ju- 
rors serving on other trials, • N = 224) = 3.89; p < .05, but neither of the 
other two questions showed significant differences. 
Instruction Type  
Of the 118 jurors who served on a criminal trial, 67 received oral instructions 
only, 42 received oral and tape-recorded instructions, and 9 received oral and 
written instructions. For purposes of analysis, jurors were grouped into oral in- 
structions only (n = 67) and augmented instruction (tape or written; n = 51) 
groups. These two groups did not differ in the number of procedural law questions 
answered correctly (M's = 4.70, 4.78) or in the percentage of substantive law 
questions (for which they received instructions) answered correctly (M's = .35, 
.40). 
Requesting Help from the Judge 
Thirty-two jurors indicated that their jury had requested help from the judge 
during their deliberation; only one received no response. In most cases, they had 
asked for clarification of the criminal law. Some heard the judge repeat the pre- 
vious instructions, some heard a tape recording, some received a written copy of 
the instructions from the judge, and some had the judge explain the statutes in 
simpler words. However,  all of these jurors had in common the fact that they both 
requested and received help from the judge. These jurors did not score signifi- 
cantly differently from other jurors on the procedural law. However, for questions 
about substantive law on which they were instructed, those who requested help 
were correct 54% of the time, whereas the jurors who were instructed but did not 
ask for help were correct 31% of the time (see Table 3); this difference was highly 
significant, X2(1, N = 187) = 8.61, p < .01). 
In order to discover which type of assistance was most useful to the jurors, 
participants who had requested help were classified by the type of response they 
got. Two categories were created--jurors who returned to the courtroom and 
simply listened to the same instructions again (in spoken or tape recorded form), 
and jurors who received instructions in a new form (either they received a written 
copy of the instructions to take with them into the jury room, or the judge ex- 
plained the statutes in his or her own words). The jurors who received additional 
Table 3. Percentage Breakdown for Criminal Jurors on Questions Specific to the 
Instructions Received by "Asked Judge" Condition 
Number of 
Asked judge? questions Incorrect Co~ect Don't know 
Yes 51 .26 .54 .20 
No 133 .38 .31 .32 
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information from the judge were correct on 67% of the substantive law instruc- 
tions for which they were instructed (N = 21 questions), while those who simply 
heard a repetition of the instructions were correct 45% of the time (N = 33 
questions). Although these groups are too small for reliable statistical analysis, the 
data are suggestive. Simply hearing the instructions repeated improved under- 
standing (14% over the jurors who did not receive help), but receiving supple- 
mental information from the judge, be it a written copy of the instructions or a 
description in less complicated terms, seemed to improve understanding even 
more (36% over the jurors who did not receive help). 
Background Factors 
The data were examined to see whether age, previous experience on juries, 
education, or gender were predictors of performance. Two-way cross tabulations 
were performed on each demographic variable for both procedural and substan- 
tive law questions. No significant effects were found due to age or previous jury 
experience. Education had no effect, except that the 5 participants who had law 
degrees all scored approximately 20% higher than the average. Gender did not 
predict knowledge of procedural law, but men were correct 40% of the time on the 
substantive law questions, whereas women were correct 35% of the time. This 
difference was significant, t(222) = 2.11, p < .05; however, after removing the 
lawyers from the sample (four of the five lawyers were male), and participants 
who did not indicate their education level, the gender difference was only mar- 
ginally significant, t(206) = 1.73; p = .08. z 
Analyses of covariance were performed to determine whether any of these 
factors affected the results previously obtained. After controlling for these vari- 
ables, the differences between instructed and uninstructed jurors' performance on 
procedural law questions were still significant, F = (2,202) = 7.07, p < .002, and 
all other tests remained insignificant. 
D I S C U S S I O N  
Overall, jurors' understanding of the judges' instructions was far from com- 
plete; they responded correctly to questions of law less than half the time. How- 
ever, some procedural conditions were found to have a significant effect on juror 
performance. Judges' instructions significantly improved performance on ques- 
tions about the procedural law, but instructions had no effect on jurors' knowl- 
edge of the substantive law they were supposed to apply. The procedural law 
z For  statistical purposes ,  it should be noted that  in the latter sample  the var iance among  w o m e n  
(12.05) was m u c h  greater  than  the  variance for men  (8.61); this was a significant difference, F(113,93) 
= 1.40; p < .05. W o m e n '  s scores  had more  outlying data  points  at both ends  of the distr ibution curve 
than  did m e n ' s  scores,  Because  it is an assumpt ion  of a t tes t  that  the  var iances  are similar, caut ion 
should  be used  when  evaluat ing the statist ics on gender  differences.  
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instructions, though effectively raising jurors' knowledge above baseline levels, 
failed to raise it to a level desirable for fair and meaningful deliberation. Jurors 
who requested help from the judge scored significantly higher than other jurors 
when tested for recall of judges' instructions. Written or plain-English responses 
from the judges in response to requests for help seemed to improve performance 
more than a simple reiteration of previous instructions. 
Our results also indicate that the idea that the attorneys resolve ambiguities 
of the pattern instructions may reflect the ideal attorney performance described in 
trial manuals rather than the actual behavior of most attorneys in most real trials. 
This ideal is very likely a fiction in most cases. First, it may not occur to the 
attorneys to mention more than one or two obvious points of law, such as the 
reasonable doubt standard (for criminal defense lawyers). In consulting with trial 
lawyers, one of us has often been faced with blank stares when she suggested that 
voir dire and closing argument should educate the jurors about the law. Second, 
the attorneys may be unevenly matched, so that only the law favorable to one side 
is clarified. Third, points of law that neither side considers particularly advanta- 
geous may go unmentioned. If the prosecutor is charging first degree murder and 
the defense attorney is arguing for self defense, who is going to explain the 
difficult concepts of second-degree murder and manslaughter, even though these 
may be the most likely verdicts? 
Jurors who received written or tape-recorded instructions did not perform 
better than those who received only oral instructions. Although these results are 
counterintuitive, they are consistent with the meager body of previous research 
(Hastie, 1983; Heuer & Penrod, 1989). A useful next step might be a deliberation 
study in which subjects' actual u s e  of the written or taped instructions is exam- 
ined. 
A new finding of this study is that jurors who requested help from the judge 
performed substantially better than those subjects who did not. When the judge 
responded by providing supplemental information, either in the form of written 
instructions or by explaining the instructions in their own words, the jurors' 
understanding of the instructions reached fairly high levels (up to 67%). 
Unfortunately, comments we received on the questionnaires indicated that 
judges do not always encourage jurors to ask questions, and that judges' demea- 
nor in the courtroom is often intimidating, making jurors reluctant to interrupt the 
proceedings. One participant, a 34-year-old who had finished some college, felt 
that the judge "just wanted us to reach a decision. He seemed worried that there 
would be a hung jury when we asked for more instructions." A 38-year-old par- 
ticipant with a high school diploma said that after asking for additional information 
about the instructions for tax fraud, "We were told that we were responsible for 
deciding appropriate definitions of terms in tax law. We felt adrift and being [sicJ 
in a position of making law instead of applying it." Since our results indicate that 
jurors who receive help perform significantly better than those who muddle 
through, we would recommend that jurors be informed that they may ask ques- 
tions and encouraged to do so. Additionally, further research in this area would be 
desirable, in order to confirm this finding and examine in greater detail the dy- 
namics of asking the judge for assistance. 
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Some Methodological Considerations 
Of course it is possible that our questionnaire was exceptionally difficult. 
However,  all our questions were based on the very jury instructions that were 
given in court, with some plain-English changes made in an attempt to enhance 
participants' understanding. Despite our efforts, some subjects commented that 
they thought the questionnaire was difficult, imposing, or vague. The majority of 
these participants were well-educated people who expressed frustration, no doubt 
because they were unaccustomed to having difficulty with written material. Iron- 
ically, hostility was usually directed at the experimenters and not at the actual 
instructions from which the taxing questions were taken. A 24-year-old college 
graduate commented, "This is really a joke! Maybe ask the questions in laymen's 
terms. I 'm hardly sure of some of these answers. But you U-M lawyers probably 
like to make the average citizen feel 'dumb.' I, too, have a degree but I 'm not 
stuffing it in others' faces !" Another participant, a 23-year-old college graduate, 
wrote a long memo on the back of her questionnaire which began as follows, "I  
am a copy editor for a major magazine. As a defender of clear and meaningful 
prose, I feel compelled to correct some of the language in your questionnaire." 
Clearly, many participants disliked the wording of the questions, but few recog- 
nized that the language was the same as they had heard in court. 
Given the less-than-perfect response rate, it is also possible that the results 
reflect a skewed sample. Though the participants performed poorly on most tasks, 
it seems unlikely that the sample was systematically biased toward those who 
were most ignorant, inattentive, or uninterested. Rather, one would expect that 
those who returned the survey were the people most interested in juries and the 
law, and possibly most knowledgeable. In fact, if the participant pool was unrep- 
resentative, it was because it tended to favor the well-educated. 
Finally, because we did not communicate with our respondents until after 
they had completed their month of jury service, the data from this study, standing 
alone, could reflect poor recall of the judge's instructions rather than poor com- 
prehension. It is conceivable that real jurors understand the instructions well 
when they hear them, but forget them once their jury service is over. We feel that 
this interpretation is unlikely, because our findings do not stand alone. Given the 
numerous laboratory studies that have demonstrated poor comprehension on im- 
mediate posttest measures, the parsimonious explanation is that the poor perfor- 
mance of our jurors reflects the same disability, rather than a different one. 
Further Questions and Implications 
Our aim in this study was to discover whether the poor understanding of the 
law repeatedly shown by subjects in jury simulation studies generalizes to real 
jurors sitting on real cases. The answer is clearly yes. The amount of supplemen- 
tary instruction given by the attorneys in our study did not dramatically improve 
juror comprehension over the dismal levels found in laboratory studies. Our study 
does not address the question of the potential effectiveness of attorney instruc- 
t i on - tha t  is, we cannot tell whether our jurors were exposed to frequent repeti- 
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tions of important instructions and still missed the point, or whether the attorneys 
failed to take advantage of their opportunity to communicate the law. Probably 
attorney performance was quite variable. 
One might approach this question by counting the number of times various 
legal points were mentioned in the course of actual trials to discover whether 
frequency of repetition correlates with juror performance. Given the wide vari- 
ability in types of case, and the ambiguities inherent in trying to code the a c c u r a c y  
of the attorney's attempts to communicate the law, it would be very difficult to 
" score"  attorneys' communication of the law during an actual trial. Also, in order 
to control for type of case and judicial instructional style, a very large number of 
trials would have to be observed. A better method for answering this question 
would be to conduct further experimental studies, in which systematic variation of 
attorney techniques could provide useful information on how lawyers might im- 
prove juror comprehension. 
We have shown that jurors' performance is low in an absolute sense, in that 
it falls far short of perfection, but we have not discussed that performance relative 
to anyone else's. What base line is appropriate in evaluating our claim that juror 
comprehension is low? Could anyone do better? 
We feel that the fact that jurors are unable to understand half the instructions 
they are supposed to apply is a serious cause for concern regardless of what a 
realistic base line might be. There are, however, some glimmers of information in 
our data suggesting that better comprehension is possible. Two of the lawyers in 
our sample actually served on juries. Their performance was better than that of 
the lay jurors (70% correct) and better than that of the uninstructed lawyers. 
Although they did better than other jurors, they too fell rather short of perfect 
performance, suggesting first, that 100% accuracy may be an unrealistic assump- 
tion, and second, that the problem is not simply a function of the incompetence of 
lay jurors, but of the current methods of jury instruction. 
Also, jurors who asked for clarification and got it performed better than the 
others, substantially so when they received more than a simple reiteration. Thus 
while 100% performance may (or may not) be out of reach, considerable improve- 
ment over the 40% level seems an eminently realistic goal. 
Does it matter? Do legal policymakers care about the effective communica- 
tion of legal instructions to the jury? An enormous proportion of appellate court 
decisions involve errors in instruction. Every day cases that have gone through 
months or years of preparation and litigation are reversed because the judge failed 
to state the law with exact accuracy. Jury instructions are constantly being re- 
written to reflect more precisely the nuances of the law, but legal policymakers 
and courts rarely concern themselves with jurors' comprehension of the law. 
Unless some attention is paid to the jurors' use  of the instructions they are given, 
the never-ending, intensive solicitude for the wording of the taw is pedantry in 
fantasyland: The law as spoken by the judge is of the utmost consequence; the law 
as understood by the jurors, moments later, is not a matter of concern. Either this 
implies the assumption that the jurors do understand what the judge says, or it 
implies that judicial instructions are magical incantations, in which the perfect 
utterance is not a means to understanding but an end in itself. 
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